AbstractS. We present and analyze a probabilistic method for verification by explicit state enumeration, which improves on the "hashcompact" method of Wolper and Leroy. The hashcompact method maintains a hash table in which compressed values for states instead of full state descriptors are stored. This method saves space but allows a non-zero probability of omitting states during verification, which may cause verification to miss design errors (i.e. verification may produce "false positives"). Our method improves on Wolper and Leroy's by calculating the hash and compressed values independently, and by using a specific hashing scheme that requires a low number of probes in the hash table. The result is a large reduction in the probability of omitting a state. Hence, we can achieve a given upper bound on the probability of omitting a state using fewer bits per compressed state. For example, we can reduce the number of bytes stored for each state from the eight recommended by Wolper and Leroy to only five, and still enumerate state spaces of up to 80 million reachable states while keeping the probability of missing even one state to less than 0.13%. The new verification scheme was tried on some large, industrial examples. The results predicted by the theoretical analysis were confirmed by the outcomes of these examples. We also discuss some practical issues in choosing the number of bits for the compressed state representation, along with some of our experiences in implementing the scheme.
Introduction
Complex protocols are often verified by examining all reachable protocol states from a set of possible start states. This teachability analysis can be done using two different methods: The states can be explicitly enumerated, by storing them individually in a table, or a symbolic method can be used, such as representing the reachable state space with a binary decision diagram (BDD) [2] .
The biggest obstacle of both methods is the often unmanageably huge number of reachable states -the "state explosion problem". Symbolic methods can alleviate the state explosion problem in some cases. However, in research done in our group for some types of industrial protocols, explicit state enumeration has out-performed the symbolic approach [10] .
In explicit state enumeration algorithms, a state table is maintained that will eventually hold all reachable states of the protocol under verification. This state table is usuMly implemented as a hash table. In practice, the total memory available for the hash table is the limiting resource in verification. Therefore, it is desirable to use the most compact representation for this table. The probabilistic verification method presented and analyzed in this paper improves on Wolper and Leroy's "hashcompact" method [16] , which reduces the memory requirements for the state table. The hashcompact method was, in turn, inspired by Holzmann's supertrace algorithm [9] .
The basic supertrace algorithm maintains a huge table of bits which are initially set to zero. When a state is inserted into the table, the bit corresponding to the hash value of the state is set to one. Whenever two states hash to the same location, they are assumed to be the same. For a large number of states, it is almost certain that two distinct states will hash to the same location. This results in the omission of the second state and -since the search algorithm backtracks when it finds a state that has been searched already -may potentially cause the omission of all successor states of the omitted state. Therefore, although supertrace intuitively seems to explore a high percentage of the reachable states of a protocol if the number of bits in the table is bigger than the number of reachable states, full coverage is extremely unlikely. Actually, Holzmann emphasizes that supertrace is only meant as a partial-search technique for protocols that cannot be analyzed exhaustively [9, page 232].
Wolper and Leroy observed that if a compressed state descriptor with, say 64 bits, instead of one bit is stored for each state (plus the information regarding which slots in the hash table are occupied), the probability of omitting even one state becomes very small, thus giving a bound on the probability of a false positive. The space savings of such a scheme are not as impressive as the supertrace algorithm, but still very substantial: the state descriptors for a typical protocol might be 100 bytes, which the hashcompact method could reduce to eight bytes with a very small probability of omitting states in the verification.
Wolper and Leroy implicitly assumed that the hash values for storing the compressed state descriptors are calculated using this compressed state descriptor. We show that, by deriving the hash values independently from the compressed state descriptor and by employing a particular hashing scheme with a low number of probes in the table, the omission probability can be reduced significantly. Our new analysis of the omission probability shows that one only needs to store five bytes for each state in situations where Wolper and Leroy recommend storing eight bytes.
Using this 5-byte compression, one can, for example, store 80 million states with an omission probability smaller than 0.13%. Furthermore, by re-running the verifier with different hash and compression functions, each yielding independent values from the ones of the previously employed function, one can further reduce this probability. For example, two verification runs for the above example would yield an omission probability smaller than (0.13%) ~ = 1.69. 10 -6. We have extended the Mur~ verification system developed at Stanford with the probabilistic verification scheme. In prior work, the "old" Mur~ system was successfully applied to several industrial protocols [5, 6, 12, 14, 17] . We tried the new, probabilistic scheme on some of these protocols. No omissions occurred using 5-byte compression. Then, we looked at one of these protocols and varied the number of bits in the compressed state descriptors. For each value, we conducted multiple runs of the verifier with randomly chosen hash and compression functions. The outcomes of these experiments corresponded with the omission probabilities from the theoretical analysis. Furthermore, the mean number of omitted states at, for example, 55% omission probability was only 3.2, out of 109 080 reachable states. Thus, coverage is expected to degrade very slowly.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the probabilistic verification scheme in more detail. The omission probabilities obtained using this scheme are calculated in Sect. 3. In Sect. 4, the omission probabilities for 4-byte and 5-byte compression are graphed and the choice of the number of bits in the compressed values is discussed. Some experience gained in implementing the probabilistic verification scheme is elucidated in Sect. 5. We describe the results on larger example protocols in Sect. 6. Finally, Sect. 7 contains some conclusions and suggestions for future research.
2
The Probabilistic Verification Scheme
The new, probabilistic verification method is described in this section. However, first the basic algorithms for explicit state enumeration on which the new method is based and the hashing and compression schemes employed are explained in more detail. In these explanations, some definitions are made that will be used in calculating the omission probability.
Explicit State Enumeration
In explicit state enumeration, the automatic verifier tries to examine all reachable states from a set of possible start states. Either breadth-first or depth-first search can be employed for the state enumeration process. Both the breadth-first and the depth-first algorithms are straightforward. A depth-first algorithm is, for example, given in [16] . [15] . Let Pr(A) denote the probability of event A and let S denote the set of all possible states. Furthermore, let H be a universal2 class of hash functions [3] from S to {0,...,l-1). Details about the particular universal2 class of hash functions used in our implementation can be found in Sect. 5. If we randomly and uniformly choose one function in H as our compression function c, the universal2 property guarantees that the probability that two different states have the same compressed value is bound, namely 1 Pr(c(sl)=c(s2)) <_ 7 for all Sl,S2 E S, s1#s~ .
Hence, universal2 hashing is guaranteed to perform at least as good as uniform compression, where for all different sl, s2 6 S, Pr(c(sl)=c(s2)) = {. Furthermore, it can be shown that the above bound will be tight in our application of universal2 hashing. Therefore, universal2 hashing will perform almost exactly like uniform compression.
The Probabilistic Verification Scheme
The probabilistic verification scheme only behaves differently from the basic explicit state enumeration algorithms when a newly reached state s is entered into the hash table. This state insertion process is depicted in Fig It is important to observe that only the slots examined using the probe sequence can lead to omissions. Usually, only a few slots are examined before an empty Slot is found (which is why hashing is attractive in the first place). This positive effect of hashing on reducing the likelihood of omissions was not considered by Wolper and Leroy [16] , who implicitly assumed that the probe sequence is calculated from the compressed value. Under their assumptions, states with the same compressed value inevitably lead to omissions.
Using our improved probabilistic verification algorithm, the choice of the hashing scheme affects the omission probability. A "good" hashing scheme for our probabilistic verification algorithm has few collisions in an unsuccessful search, i.e. while inserting a new state. We employ double hashing since its performance is very close to uniform hashing, where no clustering occurs. Clustering would increase the number of collisions in unsuccessful searches.
Calculation of the Omission Probabilities
In the following, we first derive an approximate formula for the omission probability in our probabilistic verification scheme. In the examples tested, this approximation formula seems to be very accurate. However, we also derive another formula that is an upper bound for the omission probability but is less accurate than the approximation formula. Finally, the results from the analytical calculations are compared with results from a simulation of the probabilistic verification scheme.
Approximate Analysis
For the following analysis, we assume that uniform hashing and uniform compression are used. Let E[X] denote the expected value of random variable X and nk ~-1 = YI~=0 (n -i) the falling factorial power. Besides that, let In denote log e. Recall that m denotes the number of slots in the hash table and I the number of compressed values. We assume that we insert n distinct states, numbered 1,..., n, into the table.
-We first look at a situation where the first k of the n states were inserted into the 
We define Nk to be the event that there is no omission when inserting the (k+l)st state given that there were no omissions when the first k states were inserted. Let N~ be the corresponding unconditional event, namely that there is no omission when inserting the (k+l)st state into the 
Here, it is assumed that the j comparisons of the compressed value to be entered with the values in the table are mutually independent. However, remember that we conditioned on the situation where no omission occurred during the insertion of the first k states. This condition imposes some dependence on the compressed values in the table. The values have the tendency to be different from each other because the omission cases -where at least two compressed values are equal -were filtered out by the condition. Thus, (2) underestimates the resulting omission probability. In practice, we use the probabilistic verification scheme with a bound on the omission probability when inserting n states into the table. Hence, the omission probability for one of the n states will be very small -especially when n is large -and so will be the filtering effect of the condition. This is confirmed by experimental results presented later. Using the theorem of total probability, one can easily obtain from (1) and (2) the conditional probability that there is no omission inserting the (k+l)st state given there are k states in the table, yielding
j=o Observe that, in general, omissions change the distribution of Ck, since the insertion algorithm stops when a compressed value in the table equals the compressed value of the (k+ 1)st state. However, we can use the unaltered Ck distribution as given in (1) in the above calculation of Pk. To see why this is correct, imagine that we altered our insertion algorithm so that it always probes until an empty slot is found and so that the final insertion is only made if none of the probed slots contained the compressed value of the (k+l)st state. Clearly, this algorithm behaves exactly the same way as the "old" insertion algorithm except an increased run-time and except that the number of collisions is distributed according to the unaltered Ck distribution.
Now, we consider the situation where we insert n states into the (initially empty) table. Using the definitions of Nk and Pk, the probability that we have no omissions inserting all n states is obtained as 
k----0
By substituting (3) into (4) and making the falling factorial powers explicit, we obtain the following formula for the probability that there are no omissions inserting n states into the table to be
Straightforward evaluation of this formula requires O(n 3) operations. In practice, we need to calculate the omission probability for state spaces on the order of 10 million reachable states. Therefore, we now derive an approximation formula that only needs O(1) operations.
For this approximation, we re-consider (3) in a slightly different form, namely
P~ "~ E I.___1_1 Pr(C~ =j) . (6) j=o
The right-hand side is an instance of the theorem of total probability. The "expected" exponent of the term (f~A_) is the expected value of Ck. Thus, we approximate
Plugging this approximation into (4) yields
;.o ~ (s)
This formula has a simple, intuitive explanation. The sum equals the expected value of the total number of collisions inserting n states into a conventional hash table. For each of these collisions, we have a probability of (~-!) that no omission occurs and the compressed value comparison is approximately independent of all others. Using this formula, the sum in (8) can be written in closed form as
k--0
where Hn denotes a harmonic number. Using the asymptotic approximation for gn given, for example, in [8, (9. 28)] we obtain
Substituting (10) and (11) into (8), we obtain the final result of our approximation effort, namely
Obviously, the evaluation of this formula only requires O(1) operations and it is thus useful for handling our "arbitrarily" large values of n. In the remainder of this paper, we will only consider the omission probability of our probabilistic verification scheme. Clearly, this probability can be calculated as Pom := Pr(one or more omissions inserting n states) = 1 -Pno 9
Upper Bound
An upper bound for the omission probability is derived in the appendix yielding 
Simulation Results
We wrote a simulator for the probabilistic verification scheme to assess if the theoretical results for the omission probability can be achieved in a practical implementation. Here, we only show results for an example with a small number of slots in the hash table. Results running the real verifier on larger examples can be found in Sect. 6. One experiment of the simulator Consists of generating n states with a random number generator and inserting the compressed values into a hash table. The experiment is repeated N times with different states. Finally, the omission probability is calculated as the number of experiments where omissions occurred divided by N.
The simulation results discussed in the following were obtained by repeating each experiment N = 10 million times, using a hash table with m = 199 slots and using b = 10 bits for the compressed values. The number of states n inserted into the table was used as a parameter. Simulation runs were performed for n = 19, 39,..., 199. (13) with the simulation results. Observe that the omission probability rises as the table fills up. Wolper and Leroy's formula clearly overestimates the omission probability, and the upper bound becomes less accurate for larger values of the omission probability. Both, Our final approximation (12) and the O(n 3) formula (5) yield values that are so close to the simulation values for the omission probability that the graphs coincide in Fig. 2 .
Therefore, in Fig. 3 the relative errors of the omission probabilities obtained by the O(n 3) formula and the final approximation are shown. Furthermore, the relative errors of the 90% confidence intervals of the omission probabilities are graphed. All relative errors were calculated using the simulation results as exact values. Both, final approximation and O(n 3) formula yield relative errors smaller then 0.8%.
Observe that the values from the final approximation are always bigger than the ones from the O(n 3) formula while still being very close to the exact values. As discussed before, the O(n 3) formula slightly underestimates the omission probability. table of size 400 million  bytes and present a table showing the number of bits in the compressed values  dependent on hash table size and maximum omission probability. Finally, a rule of thumb for the maximum omission probability is derived.
5-byte and 4-byte Compression
As mentioned before, for the following two examples a hash table size of 400 million bytes was chosen. Not coincidentally, this number corresponds well with the available DRAM on our largest machine. Our hash table of size 400 million bytes has m = 80 million slots using 5-byte compression and m = 100 million slots employing 4-byte compression. Figures 4 and 5 show the omission probabilities for 5-byte and 4-byte compression, respectively, while the number of states n inserted into the table was varied. Even if the table fills up completely, the omission probability stays smaller than 0.13% for 5-byte compression and below 33% for 4-byte compression.
For both figures, the omission probabilities were calculated using the final approximation (12) . The upper bound (13) yields values for the omission probabilities that are usually quite close to the ones from the final approximation. The biggest difference occurs when the table fills up completely. Then, the upper bound values have relative errors of 0.06% and 21% for 5-byte and 4-byte compression, respectively. In both, 5-byte and 4-byte compression, the omission probability rises sharply immediately before the hash table fills up completely. Intuitively, this can be explained by observing that when we insert a compressed state into an almost full table, it is compared against many compressed values until an empty slot is found. Omissions may occur in any of these comparisons. In practice, the characteristic shape of the omission probability curve yields a nice behavior of our probabilistic verification scheme. If the verifier terminates without a hash table overflow, the table is usually not almost completely full and we have a much lower omission probability than in the worst case, where it fills up completely. On the other hand, if there is an overflow in the hash table, we are sure to miss states. So the final increase in the omission probability will not matter. Table 1 shows the required number of bits for the compressed values -given the size of the hash table in bytes and the maximum omission probability Pom.
The maximum omission probability occurs when the table fill up completely (i.e. n = m). Remember that typically the omission probability will be much smaller. Table 1 was generated by solving (12) numerically.
For example, if one is willing to tolerate a maximum omission probability of 50%, one could use 4-byte compression until the hash table size exceeds roughly 700 million bytes. 
-Po e-( )EL1
Using (10), Hn -~ In n + 7, e= z 1 + z (assuming a sufficiently large l) and assuming m >> 1, we get
Pommel m(Inm-1) .
Observe, that adding just one bit to the compressed values approximately halves the maximum omission probability.
Implementation
The interesting part in the implementation of the probabilistic verification algorithm is the calculation of the hash and compressed values out of the state descriptor. This calculation was done in two steps. First, a 96-bit key value (natural number) was calculated from the "arbitrary" long state descriptor using universal hashing. Second, the two hash values for double hashing and the compressed value were determined from this key.
We employed the H3 universal2 class of hash functions [3] i.e. the bits in the state descriptor select those rows of m that are to be combined with exclusive or. Note that traditional methods for calculating keys from long state descriptors contain some pitfalls. Simple adding or "exclusive oring" all words in the state descriptor yields the same key value for several kinds of symmetries. For example, if only sums and "exclusive ors" are used, any permutation of the words in the state descriptor results in the same key value and therefore necessarily leads to omissions in the verification if "permuted" states occur. This is especially severe, since many systems contain several kinds of symmetries. These problems do not occur in the universal hashing-based calculation.
We used b of the k bits of the key directly as compressed value. The hash values were calculated with the division method [4] using a subset of the remaining k-b bits of the key to achieve independence of hash and compressed values. Note that the number of slots m in the hash table can be any prime number since we employed the division method.
Results on Larger Examples
We tested the probabilistic verification scheme on three examples -Peterson's algorithm for mutual exclusion (Peterson), an industrial cache coherence protocol (cache3) and the cache coherence protocol of the Scalable Coherent Interface [11] (SCI). The sizes of all of the three examples are scalable. That explains the differing numbers of reachable states for the SCI example in the following.
In Table 2 , the three examples were scaled to yield huge numbers of reachable states. We used 5-byte compression for all of the three examples when using the probabilistic verification scheme. In the table, the run-time of the classic scheme is compared to that of the probabilistic one. Observe that there is only a small increase in the run-time requirements for the probabilistic scheme due to the calculation of the compressed values. As expected, no omissions occurred.
In the next set of experiments, we used the SCI example with n = 109 080 states and a hash table with m = 116 531 slots. We varied the number of bits b in the compressed values. For each value of b, we conducted 100 runs of the verifier with randomly chosen universal hash functions and counted the number of runs in which omissions occurred. Figure 6 compares the outcomes of these experiments with the omission probabilities from our final approximation (12) . Furthermore, the 90% confidence intervals of the omission probabilities The mean number of omitted states at, for example, 55% omission probability was only 3.2, out of 109 080 reachable states. The 90% confidence interval for the mean number of omitted states in this case was (2.6, 3.8). Thus, coverage is expected to degrade very slowly.
7
Conclusion and Future Research
The probabilistic verification scheme discussed in this paper worked reliably for several large verification examples. A small probability of omitting states during the verification process seems negligible in comparison with the other inaccuracies incurred by making verification of large systems feasible. Usually, one has to simplify systems of industrial size (e.g. by down-scaling and by omitting system parts) before they are amenable to formal verification [14] . This simplification is more likely than a small omission probability to lead to failures in detecting all errors in the system under verification. Furthermore, the omission probability can be controlled by the user of the verification system. Our rule of thumb (14) shows that adding just one bit to the compressed values halves the omission probability. Thus, it seems advantageous -whenever possible -to add a few bits to the compressed values rather than to re-run the verifier with different hash and compression functions. In practice, for large hash tables with on the order of 500 million bytes, either 5-byte or 4-byte compression is recommended -depending on the maximum omission probability one is willing to tolerate.
While space was for a long time considered to be the major limiting factor in verification, we currently experience a shift to run-time as the new major limiting factor, which increases the priority of research into accelerating explicit-state verification methods.
Finally, one improvement in the probabilistic verification scheme presented in this paper could be made. If a scheme like ordered hashing [1] that aims at reducing the complexity of the unsuccessful search in a hash table is employed, the omission probability is further reduced. Some preliminary results indicate that thereby the the number of bits in the compressed values could be reduced by a small fraction.
Then, the difference of the third and the fourth term of the right-hand side of inequality (15) Observe, that this inequality also holds for l < ~i=0 E[Ci] since Pno is a probability and thus it holds for all 1. Plugging formula (10) into (16), we finally obtain our upper bound for the omission probability, namely 
